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PROBLEM S WITH GRAHAM'S 
TWO-SYSTEMS HYPOTHESIS 
OWEN GOLDIN 
IN An'stotle's Two Systems' Daniel Graham has put forward a bold new 
hypothesis concerning the development of Aristotle's thought, which 
he labels 'the Two Systems Hypothesis'. Gra~am recognizes that the 
interpreter of Aristotle faced with conflicting doctrines sometimes has 
no recourse but to posit a development in Aristotle 's thought. But, with 
the notable exception of the speculations of Owen, 2 Graham finds 
previous developmental accounts of Aristotle's thought philosophically 
unsatisfactory. This is because genetic accounts (like those of Jaeger)J 
have typically explained changes in Aristotelia n doctrine on the basis of 
a shift in general outlook, not on Aristotle's attempts as a philosopher 
to resolve tensions arising in his earlier views. Graham's book is an 
attempt to give a developmental account of Aristotle's thought in 
metaphysics and philosophy of science without this shortcoming. 
Graham argues that Aristotle 's positing of matter was motivated by 
the failure of his earlier ontology to allow one to account for substantial 
change and that the analysis of substance as a composite of matter and 
form is structured by the model of the activity of a craftsman. Graham 
shows how the theory of the four causes as it is presented in Physics 2 is 
also structured by this model and how the potentiality/actuality 
distinction was extended to apply to Aristotle's new understanding 
of substantial change. Graham's a~ccount both explains apparent 
discrepancies in Aristotle 's views and shows why Aristotle was 
1 (Oxford, 1987). 
1 Sec G. E. L. Owen, 'Logic ami Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle', in 
l. During and G. E. L. Owen (cds.), 11 ristolle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Cent my 
(Goteborg, 1960), and 'The Platonism of Aristotle', Proceedings t{the A ristoteliau Society, 
89 <•96s), 125-so. 
1 See W. Jaeger, Aristotle: Fundamenlttls t~/ the His/my of his Del:elopmenl, trans. 
R. Robinson, 2nd edn ., (Oxford, J9-t8). 
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philosophically impelled to change his views in the manner in which he 
did. There is much of value here, and Graham's speculations are 
worthy of close consideration. But here I shall restrict myself to just 
one of Graham's basic points, that which is announced in his book's 
very title: the hypothesis that in Aristotle's writings we find two 
complete, independent, and contradictory philosophical systems, each 
with its own onto~ogy and theory of scientific explanation. 
T he aspect of this thesis that is bound to be the most controversial is 
the contention that Aristotle's first system (S ,), found in the Organon, 
is not only different from, but fundamentaUy contradicts his second 
system (S2 ) , which dominates the rest of Aristotle's work. In Graham's 
view there is 'a fault line running down the middle of Aristotle's 
philosophy' (p. viii). H e argues that Aristotle never recognized that his 
philosophical thought underwent such a radical shift, and hence at 
times imports the obsolete principles of S, into the philosophical 
speculations of S 2 • Graham suggests that this is bound to cause 
trouble, since at these times Aristotle 's conceptual framework rests on 
a set of contradictory principles. Graham leads up to an analysis of 
the metaphysical puzzles of Metaph;,sics Z, which he takes to 
be a manifestation of the philosophical confusions that arise from 
Aristotle's holding contradictory principles. According to Graham's 
analysis, Aristotle knows that he is in trouble, but does not know 
the solution-which would be to cut the problem out by the roots, 
i.e. eliminate the principles of S 1 from his thought. In the penulti-
mate chapter of Aristotle's Tmo Systems Graham shows 'what Aristotle 
should have said ' by sketching the metaphysics of a consistent 
version of S 2 . • 
Although I am persuaded by the general outline of Graham's 
developmental account, I believe that his analysis of the logical relation 
between s I and s2 is flawed, and that the difficulties of Metaph)ISics z 
are deeper than Graham suggests. Therefore I shall restrict my 
comments to these points. I shaJJ first outline some essential 
differences Graham detects between s I anq s2. I shall then argue that 
the two systems are not contradictory in the manner Graham suggests; 
rather, S 2 is a deeper and more elaborate account which contains 
all of the teachings of the 'higher-level' S 1 • In the terminology of 
contemporary philosophy of science, S, is reducible to S 2 • Next, I shaU 
turn to the shift in Aristotle's theory of explanation detected by 
Graham. I shalJ claim that to strip the philosophy of science of S 2 of 
the presuppositions of S 1 would be to have Aristotle abandon his ideal 
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of ultimate explanation, and that there is no evidence that Aristotle was 
ever tempted to move in this direction. 
Graham presents the theses of each of 'Aristotle's two systems' in a 
succinct table (pp. 8o-1). Here I shall mention only those theses 
directly relevant to the discussion at hand. 
The root difference bet\veen s I and s2 is one of ontology. In s" 
which Graham calls Atomic Substantialism, the basic things in the 
world are the primary substances of the Categories. These are those 
concrete substances that we run across in our everyday experience: 
biological entities and other middle-sized things which fall under 
certain natural kinds (p. 26). In S2 , which Graham calls Hylomorphic 
Substantialism, the theoretically basic entities are no longer such 
middle-sized concrete substances. Rather, concrete substances are 
themselves to be analysed as complexes of form and matter, and, 
according to Metaphysics Z, it is form tha t is ultimately to be identified 
with primary substance ( pp. s8-62). 
While both s I and s2 eSpOUSe the independence Of 'primary 
substance', what is meant by this phrase differs in each of the two 
theoretical discourses. In S , the term 'primary substance' refers to the 
same beings as does the phrase 'concrete substance', which is the term 
Graham employs in summarizing S2 to refer to perceptible entities 
such as Socrates. In S 2 it will not be the concrete substance Socrates 
who serves as a foundation of being, but what S 2 would consider the 
corresponding 'primary substance, Socrates' form (p. 6o). Graham 
expreSSeS the baSiC difference in the OntologieS Of s 1 and 52 by the 
following principles: SA (belonging to S,), that 'primary substances are 
ontologically indivisible particulars', and H (belonging to 52 ) , that ' the 
concrete substance is composed of form and matter' ( p. I 8o). 
As G raham sees it, this difference in ontology has repercussions in 
the philosophy of science. The central principle of the theory of 
explanation of S 1 is labelled SK: 'scientific knowledge is demonstrative 
knowledge. ' That is to say, scientific knowledge comes about through a 
certain kind of deduction calJed a demons tration, whose premisses are 
'self-evident' and exhibit the cause of the fact expressed in the 
conclusion of the demonstration (pp. 47-8). Demonstrations are so 
structured that this cause will be expressed in the demonstration's 
middle term, ' the missing link in a chain of universals exhibited by the 
terms of a sequence of syllogisms in a projected demonstrative proof' 
(p. so). Since by and large those premisses which ultimately ground 
demonstrations are definitional, expressing the essences of objects of 
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scientific inquiry, demonstrations serve to identify the sort of cause 
indicated in Post. An. 2. I I , 94a34-6, which Graham labels ' the 
essential cause' .... Graham argues that, despite Aristotle's best efforts in 
Post. An. 2. I 1 to show otherwise, the essential cause is the only kind of 
cause that can be made manjfest through the demonstrative scheme of 
s, (pp. 158-63). 
In S 2 , as Graham sees it, Aristotle adopts a deeper notion of 
scientific explanation. In this system one adequately explains a fact 
through identifying each of the four causes described in Phys. 2. 3· 
According to Graham, the rigid notion of demonstrations grounded in 
the identification of and deduction from essences plays no part here. 
Rather, in this sort of explanation the relevant metaphysical aspects of 
any enti ty, attribute, or event arc isolated and identified. Graham 
argues that this notion of scientific explanation had to wait until S 2 
because its scheme of the four causes is structured around the 'craft 
model' which is the motivation of the metaphysics of S 2 • Graham 
suggests that this is how one can so[ve a vexed problem of Aristotelian 
scholarship: how to reconcile Aristotle's own prescriptions for 
scientific research and exposition in the Posterior Ana~ytics with the 
more discursive accounts actually presented in Aristotle's scientific 
researches. According to Graham, Aristotle's scientific treatises are 
part of S 2 , written at a time in which the S, theory of demonstration 
was already obsolete (even if Aristotle himself was not aware that this 
was so). What we find in these treatises is precisely what Aristotle in 
Metaphysics A. 3 and Generation r~f Animals 1. 1 says we should find: 
the identification of each of the four causes responsible for the 
phenomenon under consideration ( pp. 3 19-23). 
2. Is Sz an extension of S,? 
The crux of Graham's argument is that s I and s2 are two incompatible 
alternative philosophical systems. Graham first rejects the traditional 
account of the relationship betvvecn the Organon and the rest of the 
Aristotelian corpus, that which states that the former is, as the name 
Organon implies, a logical tool to be employed in any discourse 
1 Graham distinguishe!> the 'essential cause' of S , from the ' formal cause' ofS , on the 
grounds that the latte r norion is drpendent on the correlative notions of matte r and f'orm, 
absent from S , (pp . 75-6). 
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concerning any subject. According to this view, S, does not itself make 
any substantive philosophic claims and hence does not conflict with 5 2 • 
Graham convincingly argues that the Categories does indeed present an 
ontology: it gives an account of the basic entities in the world (primary 
substances), derivative entities (the various kinds of accidents), and the 
relations holding between these (pp. 87- 90). 
Graham next r ejects what he calls the Extension Hypothesis, 
concerning the relationship between s I and s2. According to this view, 
5 2 is an extension of S, because '5 1 is only a preliminary statement-
either because it is simplified for the novice or because it does not yet 
take into account the full range of problems that a philosophy has to 
confront' (p. 90). I shall here review Graham's criticism of the 
Extension Hypothesis and in the light of this criticism defend a version 
of it. 
Graham's argument against the Extension Hypothesis is as fo llows. 
He writes, 'in logical theory, one system is an extension of the other if it 
contains all the axioms of the other and at least one new axiom besides ' 
( p. 91 ). An example of this would be the relationship between plane 
geometry and solid geometry. T he latter theory is built on the basis of 
the former, but has a more encompassing subject-matter. T his is made 
possible by additional axioms whklh deal with an expanded subject-
matter without contradicting or replacing any of the axioms of the first 
theory.s Graham argues that this cannot be the relation of S 1 and 
s2 because a principle of s I' SA (that 'primary substances arc 
ontologically indivisible particulars') , is not only absent from s2 but is 
supplanted by the contradictory principle H (that ' the concrete 
substance is composed of form and matter '). T wo systems whose 
principles so contradict one another cannot stand in the relation of 
theory and extension. Graham likens their relation to that between 
Euclidean and Riemannian geometries; each geometry is partially 
based on an axiom concerning parallel lines which contradicts the 
axiom of the other. They are incompatible alternatives. So, just as the 
geometer must decide whether to adopt one geometry or another 
within a given inquiry, the metaphysician must, within the context of a 
certain philosophical inquiry, adopt either a theory according to which 
the concrete substance is ontologically indivisible or one according to 
which it is not. Graham argues that problems of substantial change, 
among other considerations, lead Aristotle to a theory of the latter 
~ Cf. rhe definition of book r 1 of Euclid 's Eleme11ts . 
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kind; once Aristotle has arrived at this theory, he can apply the 
principles of the former theory only at the risk of contradicting him-
self. 
It is certainly the case that principles SA and H are mutually 
c~ntradictory, and hence S 1 cannot be an extension of S 2 in the sense 
in which Graham has defined 'extension'. But to posit a theoretical 
chasm between the two theories is not the only alternative, and the fact 
that Aristotle so deftly leaps from one theory to the other should make 
us wary of Graham's proposal. Perhaps s2 is an extension of s I in a 
looser sense. Perhaps the root contradiction Graham detects between 
S, and Sz is a function of the manner in which the subject-matter ofS 1 
is limited, and it may be that the metaphysical analysis of change that 
prompts S 2 need not entail the rejection of the core doctrines of S 1 • To 
see how this is so we need to examine more closely the nature of the 
contradiction to which Graham draws our attention. 
In S 1 a certain kind, i.e. concrete substance, is posited as basic and 
unanalysable. In S 2 that same kind is posited as analysable. Is not the 
relation between concrete substance as conceived in S 1 and concrete 
substance as conceived in S 2 the same as that between the atom as 
conceived in classical chemistry and tl1e atom as conceived in 
contemporary physics? In both cases we have on the one hand a theory 
in which a certain theoretical entity is posited as basic and 
unanalysable and on the other hand a theory in which that same entity 
is analysed as a complex of more basic theoretical entities. Although 
we might not be able to properly say that contemporary physics is an 
extension of classicaJ chemistry, surely we would not want to make the 
claim that Graham makes in regard to s I and s2: that they arc 
incommensurable and incompatible. Rather, the relationship seems to 
be that which holds between a science or theory and that to which it is 
reducible. 
What is it for one theoretical system to be reducible to an other? If a 
theory A is reducible to a theory B, one must be able to correlate those 
entities taken to be basic in A with entities or complexes of entities 
taken to be basic in B. Further, by means of these assumptions (which 
express the relations holding between the theoretical entities of the two 
systems) and the principles of B, one must be able to deduce every 
theorem of A.'' Is this the relation that holds between the ontologies of 
"See Ernest Nagel, 17u Struc/ure oj'Scimce ( ew York, 1961), 353- 4. 
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S , and S/7 There will be only one 'correspondence rule'x relating the 
ontologies ofS, and S 2 : that 'primary substance' as employed inS , has 
the same reference as 'composite substance' in s2, the synthesis of 
matter and form. That every primary substance faJls under a natural 
kind and that such a kind is a species definable as genus and differentia 
are theses of S, which, properly interpreted, will preserve their truth-
value in S2 • T he only thesis of S, that will not preserve its truth-value 
in S 2 is what Graham calls SA: that 'primary substances are 
ontologically indivisible particulars'. What are we to make of this 
principle (expressed in Cat. 5, 2a i1 -13, as 'primary substances arc 
neither said of nor in anything else')? 
The assertion that a certain entity posited by a theoretical discourse 
is not analysable as a complex of more basic entities is not to be taken 
as an integral principle of that discourse. For example, one wiJI not qua 
arithmetician identify the monad as the basic theoretical entity of 
arithmetic. This wilJ be the task of the philosopher of science, such as 
Aristotle (cf.Post.An. I. 1 , 71 01 15-16; I. 2, 72a21-4; I. 10, 76a34-6). 
Similarly, that 'primary substance' is the basic theoretical entity of S 1 is 
properly taken not as a thesis of S 1 itself, but of a meta theoretical 
discourse explicating the logical structure of S 1 • 
It might be countered that in this respect the status of a metaphysical 
discourse is unique, for, unlike other sciences, metaphysics itself 
purports to give the ultimate analysis of beings. But the notion of First 
Philosophy is i'ntroduced only in S •. Except for the use of prole in 
regard to concrete substances in the Categories, there is no indication 
that the level of analysis presented therein is meant to be ultimate. 
I conclude that all that S, tells us about the world is also told by S2 , 
but s2 tells us much more. Just as contemporary physics has deepened 
the scientific understanding of the world offered by classical chemistry, 
without rejecting classical chemistry as fundamentally incorrect, so 
with S 2 Aristotle has deepened, not rejected, the metaphysical 
understanding of the world offered by S,. The fact that the one system 
takes a certain kind of entity to be basic while the other does not does 
7 J restrict the discussion here of whether S, and S, are incommensurable to the area 
in which Graham finds the core contradiction between them: ontology. T he apparent 
incompatibili ty of the logic of the two systems (p. 8o) is also easily explained on the 
grounds I present here. For a discussion of whether the philosophy of science of S, is 
incompatible with rhat of S,., see sect. 3 below. 
H On the usc of this phrase see W. Sellars, 'Theoretical Explanation', in P!Jilosqp!Jicnl 
Perspectives (Springfield, Ill., 1967), 333· 
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not entail the two systems' incompatibili ty. T he propositiOn that a 
certain theoretical entity cannot be further analysed need not be 
considered an assumption withi11 a theory, but rather can be seen as a 
fact regarding that theory. If we take the S 1 principle of the ontological 
indivisibility of concrete substance as metatheoretical in this way, the 
fundamental contradiction G raham discerns between s I and s2 
disappears. 
Even if all of · the above is admitted, it might be countered that 
Graham is still justified in writing of a major conceptual rift between 
early and later Aristotle. T he principles by which S 1 is supplemented 
are so radical that S2 constitutes an entirely new world-view, 
employing a different paradigm. Thus, Graham speaks of the 
transition between s I and s2 as a SCientific revolution, similar tO those 
discussed by Kuhn.'1 On this view, there is such a conceptual rift 
between the two systems that there would be no way to translate the 
truths Of s I intO the VOCabulary Of S2 WithOUt doing Violence tO the 
former. Because the first theory is part of a world-view rejected by 
the second, the conceptual content of the principle of the first theory, 
taken by itself, is different from the conceptual content of the first 
theory understood as part of the more encompassing second theory. 10 
Graham supports his view that there is a radical conceptual rift 
between s, and s2 by indicating shifts in meaning in both the terms 
and the propositions of the two systems. Graham focuses on the 
following example to highlight the incommensurability of the two 
systems. According to the ontology of the Categories, the fact that 
Socrates is a substance entails that Socrates cannot be either more or 
less what he is, since substance, taken as ontologically basic, does not 
admit of the more or the less (Cat. 5, 3h33-43 1). But, as Graham 
points out, in S 2 an immature Socrates would be ' less of a man', i.e. 
less of a substance, than the mature Socrates. (As Aristotle puts it at 
Melaph. H. 8, 1oso·'4-7, the adult is 'prior in form and substance'. 
Because of the conceptual shift between S 1 and S 2 , the above S 1 
statement, interpreted in the theoretical framework of S 2 , contradicts 
the above statement ofS 2 (101-3). So even if partisans ofS 1 and Sz 
will agree with each other's statement that Socrates is a substance, that 
'' pp. 93-5, 103. Sec T . Kuhn , The Structure ~~r Scient~/ic Rt"l}Q/utians, 2nd cdn. 
(Chicago, 1970). 
111 This point is based on my understanding of remarks made by G raham at the 1988 
University of Texas at Austin Workshop in Ancient Philosophy. 
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is only because they do not fully realize what the other side means by 
that statement. 
Does the problem not lie in the fact that 'to be more or less of a 
certain substance' has not in this example been translated from the 
idiom of one discourse to that of the other? Were the partisan of S2 to 
understand what the partisan of S 1 means when he denies the 
possibility of one substance's being more or less a substance than 
an other entity, surely he would have no objection. For in denying that 
on~ man can be more or less a man than another, all the partisan of S 1 
means is that for every substantial kind, a particular entity either falls 
under that kind or it does not. There is no concern here with the 
extent to which certain potencies characteristic of that kind have been 
actualized; as Graham points ·out, the notion of form as actuality is 
alien to S. (pp. 98-1oo, 183-206). But this is not because the notion 
contradicts anything in s.; it rather belongs to a deeper level of analysis. 
Again, just because, within the theoretical structure of a system, an 
analysis is neither given nor made possible, this does not mean that this 
is entailed by the core of that system; rather, that there can be no such 
analysis ought to be considered a mctatheoretical fact. The partisan of 
S 2 would agree with the partisan ofS, that there is a sense in which no 
one is either more or less human than another, but only 5 2 presents the 
theoretical framework for discussing the difference in levels in which 
certain potencies characteristic of substantial kinds are actualized. 11 
3· Demonstration and explanation in S, 
Graham argues that in the philosophy of science, as well as in 
metaphysics, Aristotle's thought underwent a fundamental shift. The 
notion of essence, which plays a crucial role in the theory of 
explanation of S 1, 12 is alien to the craft model of generation, which 
11 Cf. the difference in the English idioms'" A is more of a man than B' and 'A is more 
human than B'. While ir can be said that Tam 'more of a man' than my 1"\vo-year-old son, 
to say that one being is more human than another is properly speaking impossible, lo r no 
human being is more human than any otlllers. The idiom can be employed only 
metaphorically, e.g. in saying that a human B acts like a robot, not displaying certain 
human facu lties that are indeed possessed, or in say1ng that a creature A (e.g. a monkey) 
djsplays abilities more like those of human beings than does crearurc B (e.g. a guinea-
pig). 
12 As Burnycat has argued, demonstrations are explanations: see M. F. Bumyeat, 
'Aris tode on Understanding Knowledge' in E. Berti (ed.), A ristotl~ rm Sricnte: Ylu 
Posterior Analytics (Padua, 1981), 97-1 39· They are not mere linguistic entities; rather, 
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motivates S 2 • Aristotle employs this model to liken the coming into 
being of a substance to the imposition of form on appropriate matter. 
In the most developed version of the theory of the four causes this 
model is to be employed in scientific explanation. For every object of 
inquiry the scientist must seek the analogues to the matter a craftsman 
takes up, the form that is imposed on it, the craftsman himself, and the 
end the craftsman has in mind (pp. 172-81). Aristotle attempts to 
dovetail the two theories by identifYing the essence of a thing with its 
formal cause. As we have seen, Graham holds this identification 
partially responsible for the paradoxes of Metaphysics Z. 13 
But suppose that Aristotle had adopted a hylomo:rphic substantialism 
free of the theory of explanation presented in the Posterior Analytics. 
What sort of scientific explanation would be possible? There are two 
possibilities. Either explanation would be wholly non-deductive or it 
would be deductive, without resting on indemonstrable first principles. 
In the first case scientific explanation would come about merely 
through the identification of each of the four causes, running down 
them in a list, as it were. Any fact complex enough to be inexplicable 
through the mere identification of the formal cause of some substances 
would be in principle inexplicable. Take, for example, the biological 
fact considered as explana·ndum in Post. An. 2. I 6-1 7= vines shed their 
leaves. Aristotle sketches an explanation which would go something 
like this: the structure of flat-leaved plants necessitates a congealing of 
they are the vehicle by which there is imparted episteme (scienti fi c understanding), the 
disposition required for answering certain 'why' questions. For this reason, Graham' 
( p. 8 1) improperly assigns the thesis BTC ('a cause is an answer to the question Why') to 
S. alone. 
u Graham takes this identification to be responsible for two other philosophical 
difficulties as well. The first is what he calls 'the empirical problem'. When actually 
engaged in his biological researches Aristotle discovers that the ideas of definiing 
biological kinds through identifying genus and species is unrealistic; in PA 1 . 2-4 
Aristotle argues that a biological definition may need to present more than one 
differentia (245-6). This does not strike me as evidence of the obsolescence of the S, 
theory of explanation in the context of real empirical research. Rather, Aristotle is 
making a relatively minor adjustment to the S, theory. The problem that Aristotle finds 
in definitions arrived at through dichotomous divisions is that such definitions are 
inadequate for grounding scientific ex'Pianations of the kath ' haura sumbebekora (the 'in 
itself accidentals') of the defiuimda. On this see P. Pellegrin, Aristotle~~ C/assijimtirm of 
Animalv: Bio/()KJ' and the Couctp!tltll Uni{)' of the A ris/()/elitlll Corpus, trans. A. Pre us 
(Berkeley, 1 986), 13-49. So Aristotle is not here challenging the thesis that scicnti fie 
explanations take the form of demonstrations based on indemonstrable definitions. The 
second problem ('the analytic problem') concerns the ontological status of genus and 
differentia. This does not seem to me to arise from the clash of contradicting systems; it 
arises in S, alone. 
Graham's Two-Systems Hypothesis 213 
sap at the juncture of the Jeaf and the stem; a vine is a flat- leaved plant, 
so this coagulation will occur in a vine. This in turn will lead to the 
vine's having its leaves drop towards the centre of the earth 
(the explanation of which fact will presumably be drawn from the 
principles of chemistry). Much more is involved here than the simple 
identification of each of the four causes. 14 T his explanation is 
deductive. 
Alternatively, scientific explanations in s2 could be deductive, 
although not demonstrative. That is to say, they would be expressed by 
inferences which do not rest on immediate premisses. Hence, the 
premisses of these deductions would themselves demand explanation. 
This would be to reject ultimacy in explanation, as most contemporary 
philosophers of science have done. This bas the consequence of either 
relegating such explanations to instruments allowing one to predict 
future events, or of making the scientific understanding that such 
explanations afford a relative affair; through them one would 
understand more than before, but questions could still be raised 
concerning the truths on which that explanation is grounded. There is 
no evidence that Aristotle had contemplated any such position in his 
philosophy of science. Even in S2 he remains convinced of the ultimate 
intelligibility of the important features of the sublunar realm. Given 
this conviction, the fundamentals of the theory of explanation offered 
in S, must find a place in any system of hylomorphic substantialism. 
I have here argued that there is no chasm separating S 1 from S 2 ; the 
latter is rather the maturation of the former. Despite the negative tenor 
of the above remarks, I would like to close by emphasizing what 
is of great value in Graham's book. Although s I and s2 may 
not be incommensurable, both are indeed comprehensive systems of 
metaphysics and philosophy of science. Graham's isolation of the 
principles of the two is noteworthy; so is his account of how Aristotle 
developed the principles of s2 to meet philosophic demands for which 
S 1 is inadequate. Although I have not here discussed these chapters of 
Graham's book, they contain many intriguing and valuable argum ents 
worthy of close consideration. 
Marquette University, Milwaukee 
14 If we are lo adopt an 5 1 free of the presuppositions ofS, we could not even say that 
this explanation has identified the formal cause of shedding. For in 5 1 , as Graham 
conceives it, form has a role only as an ontological component of substance, and 
shedding is not a substance. 
